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Abstract
This paper extends the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet (Games Econ. Behav. 22
(1998) 260–273). They have shown that there exists no universal knowledge space to which
every knowledge space can be mapped in a knowledge-preserving manner. We show that an
analogous nonexistence result holds in the more general context of information structures.
These structures can be viewed as generalizations of knowledge spaces that describe non-
probabilistic beliefs.
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1. Introduction
Type spaces as introduced by Harsanyi [8] and knowledge spaces as introduced by
Aumann [1] are the two prevalent models used to describe interactive uncertainty in
game theory and economics. The knowledge spaces, respectively Harsanyi type
spaces, used in applications are usually ﬁnite. Regardless, they typically do not
contain enough states so as to represent all the potential states of mind that the
players could possibly have about the interaction at hand. This poses the question as
to whether the missing states prevent a correct analysis of the problem.
Mertens and Zamir [15] showed that this problem does not arise for Harsanyi type
spaces. They showed that, under suitable topological assumptions on the type
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of the world. That is, they showed the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space to
which every Harsanyi type space (on the same space of states of nature) can be
mapped by a morphism. A morphism is a map that preserves the state of nature and
the beliefs of the players. Therefore, the analysis carried out in a ﬁnite or otherwise
restrictive Harsanyi type space could be transferred, intact, to the universal Harsanyi
type space where all the relevant states of affairs are present. The proof of the
existence of a universal Harsanyi type space was extended to more general
topological cases by Brandenburger and Dekel [3], Heifetz [9], Mertens et al. [14],
and ﬁnally to the general measure theoretic case by Heifetz and Samet [12].
Knowledge (see, for example, [1,2] or [10]) is usually described by knowledge
spaces. For each player, there is a partition of the underlying space of states of the
world: For each state, the player knows an event if and only if the partition member
that contains the state is contained in the event. Deﬁned in this way, knowledge has
the following properties: What is known by a player is true. A player knows what he
knows and he knows what he does not know. Consequently, the assumptions on the
epistemic attitudes of the players are rather strong in these models.
Recently, less demanding information structures have been considered in the
literature in order to approach issues like bounded rationality or unawareness.
Various standard solution concepts have been examined in these generalized
information structures (see [4,7,17,18], and, for an overview, [5, Section 7] or [16,
Chapter 3]). In such an information structure (or ‘‘Kripke structure’’, as it is called in
Modal Logic (see [13])), each player’s beliefs are described by a binary relation on the
set of states of the world: For each state of the world, the player believes in an event
if the event contains all those states of the world that are in relation with this state of
the world. With each state of the world there is an associated state of nature
1 which
speciﬁes the values of all the relevant objective parameters of the players’ interaction.
Examples of such objective parameters are the payoff functions, signals, or initial
endowments. Imposing different restrictions on the relations of the players leads to
different epistemic attitudes of the players (see [4–6],o r[16] for more on this issue).
For example, if the relations are equivalence relations, we are, in fact, in the case of
knowledge spaces.
Heifetz and Samet [11] showed that, given at least two players and at least two
states of nature, there is no universal knowledge space. However, as mentioned
above, there is a universal Harsanyi type space.
One could imagine two potential sources for this discrepancy. Either, it is due to
the different mathematical frameworks. That is, sets and binary relations
(respectively partitions) on one side, and measurable spaces and probability
measures on the other side. Or, alternatively, it is due to the strong assumptions
on the players’ epistemic attitudes in the case of knowledge, especially the truth
axiom (‘‘what a player knows in a state of the world is true in this state’’,
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These assumptions rule out the possibility that a player’s type in some state of the
world in a Harsanyi type space can be certain, with probability 1, of some event
which does not obtain in that state.
In the latter case, it could be possible that there is a universal information
structure for classes of information structures with relaxed assumptions (in
comparison to the case of knowledge) on the epistemic state of mind of the players.
Since almost all classes of information structures considered in the literature contain
the class of knowledge spaces, ‘‘relaxed’’ requires that knowledge spaces satisfy these
assumptions as well.
To treat the question of the existence of a universal information structure
rigorously, we deﬁne structure preserving maps between information structures, so
called morphisms. Then, unfortunately, we show that we have to abandon the hope
of having a universal information structure: Given at least two players and at least
two states of nature, for every class of information structures that contains all
knowledge spaces there is no universal information structure (Corollary 1). This is
true even if we do not require the morphisms from the information structures to the
universal information structure to be unique (Theorem 1).
The result is not proved by adapting the methods of the proof of Heifetz and
Samet [11]. Instead, we use their result. The underlying idea is simple: Assuming by
contradiction the existence of a universal information structure for a class of
information structures that contains all knowledge spaces, we ‘‘collect’’ all those
states lying in the images of knowledge spaces under morphisms, thus constructing a
universal knowledge space, which, by the result of Heifetz and Samet, cannot exist.
2. The nonexistence theorem
In all what follows, let S be a nonempty set of states of nature and I a nonempty
set of players.
Deﬁnition 1. An information structure on S for player set I (‘‘information structure’’,
for short) is a triplet
%
M :¼ /M;ðKiÞiAI;yS
where
* M is a nonempty set,
* for iAI : KiDM   M;
* y is function from M to S:
y relates the states of M; the so-called states of the world, to the states of nature.
yðmÞ is the state of nature that corresponds to the state of the world m: Ki is the
possibility relation of player i: ðm;nÞAKi means that in the state m player i considers
the state n to be possible.
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%
M on S for player set I is called a knowledge
space if for every iAI; Ki is an equivalence relation.
The following deﬁnition captures the idea of mapping one information structure
to another in a way that preserves the structure of the spaces.
Deﬁnition 3. Let
%
M and
%
M0 be information structures on S for player set I:
A morphism from
%
Mt o
%
M0 is a function f : M-M0 such that:
1. for all mAM:
y
0ð fðmÞÞ ¼ yðmÞ;
2. for all iAI and mAM:
fðKiðmÞÞ ¼ K
0
ið fðmÞÞ;
where
KiðmÞ :¼f nAM jð m;nÞAKig and
fðNÞ :¼f fðnÞjnANg; for NDM:
Deﬁnition 4. Let
%
M be an information structure on S for player set I: For an event
EDM deﬁne
KiðEÞ :¼f mAMjKiðmÞDEg:
Ki : PowðMÞ-PowðMÞ
is called i’s belief operator.
The following proposition, which is analogous to Proposition 2.1 of Heifetz and
Samet [11], shows that Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 3 is equivalent to the preservation
of beliefs in terms of the belief operators:
Proposition 1. Let
%
M and
%
M0 be information structures on S for player set I: For a
function f :M-M0 the following are equivalent:
1. For all iAI and mAM : fðKiðmÞÞ ¼ K
0
ið fðmÞÞ:
2. For all iAI and E0DM0 : f  1ðK0
iðE0ÞÞ ¼ Kið f  1ðE0ÞÞ:
This shows in particular that the morphisms deﬁned by Heifetz and Samet [11],
although deﬁned for partition spaces, are the same as the ones deﬁned here in the
special case of knowledge spaces.
Proof. Note the following facts, which follow directly from the deﬁnitions:
mAKið f  1ðE0ÞÞ iff KiðmÞDf  1ðE0Þ
iff fðKiðmÞÞDE0;
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mAf  1ðK0
iðE0ÞÞ iff fðmÞAK0
iðE0Þ
iff K
0
ið fðmÞÞDE0:
We show ﬁrst that 1. implies 2.: Let iAI and E0DM0: For all mAM; we have
fðKiðmÞÞ ¼ K
0
ið fðmÞÞ and hence for all mAM; fðKiðmÞÞDE0 iff K
0
ið fðmÞÞDE0:
Therefore it follows for all mAM that mAKið f  1ðE0ÞÞ iff mAf  1ðK0
iðE0ÞÞ; that is
Kið f  1ðE0ÞÞ ¼ f  1ðK0
iðE0ÞÞ:
We show now that 2. implies 1.: Let iAI and mAM: Letting E0 ¼ fðKiðmÞÞ
implies by 2. that K
0
ið fðmÞÞDfðKiðmÞÞ; and letting E0 ¼ K
0
ið fðmÞÞ implies by 2.
that fðKiðmÞÞDK
0
ið fðmÞÞ: Hence we have that fðKiðmÞÞ ¼ K
0
ið fðmÞÞ: &
Deﬁnition 5. Let C be a nonempty class of information structures on S for player set
I: An information structure on S for player set I
%
OC :¼ /O;ðK
O
i ÞiAI;y
OS
is
* weak-universal for C if for every information structure
%
MAC there is a morphism
from
%
M to
%
OC;
* universal for C if
%
O
CAC and for every information structure
%
MAC there is a
unique morphism from
%
M to
%
OC:
Theorem 1. Let C be a class of information structures on S for player set I that
contains all knowledge spaces. If S and I have each at least two elements, then there is
no weak-universal information structure for C:
Of course, a universal information structure for C is also a weak-universal
information structure for C; hence:
Corollary1. Let C be a class of information structures on S for player set I that
contains all knowledge spaces. If S and I have each at least two elements, then there is
no universal information structure for C:
Let us now introduce some classes of information structures that have been used
in the literature.
Deﬁnition 6. Let M be a nonempty set. A binary relation K on M is
* serial if for every mAM there is a nAM such that ðm;nÞAK;
* Euclidean if for all m1;m2;m3AM: ðm1;m2ÞAK and ðm1;m3ÞAK imply
ðm2;m3ÞAK:
Deﬁnition 7. Let MI (respectively, Mr
I; Mrt
I ; Mest
I ; PI) be the class of all information
structures on S for player set I (respectively the class of information structures on S
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Euclidean, serial and transitive; reﬂexive, symmetric and transitive (that is,
knowledge spaces)).
These classes correspond to different axiom systems of modal logic, namely the
systems KI (respectively, TI; S4I; KD45I; S5I), see [6] for the deﬁnitions of these
axiom systems. It is easy to see that all the above classes contain the class PI (that is,
the class of knowledge spaces).
Corollary2. If S and I each have at least two elements, then there is no weak-universal
information structure for the class of all information structures on S for player set I;
the class Mr
I; the class Mrt
I ; the class Mest
I ; and the class PI:
Proof. As already remarked, every knowledge space on S for player set I belongs to
each of these classes. &
Corollary3. If S and I each have at least two elements, then there is no universal
information structure for the class of all information structures on S for player set I;
the class Mr
I; the class Mrt
I ; the class Mest
I ; and the class PI:
3. The Proof
Proof of Theorem 1. We use the nonexistence result of [11], where it was shown that
for the class of knowledge spaces there is no weak-universal information structure
which itself is a knowledge space.
2 Now, let us assume on the contrary that there is a
weak-universal information structure
%
OC ¼ /O;ðK
O
i ÞiAI;y
OS for C: According to
the assumptions of the theorem, PI is contained in C: Let
OP :¼f oAO j (
%
MAPI ( morphism h:
%
M-
%
OC such that oAhðMÞg:
Now deﬁne
%
OP :¼ /OP;ðK
O
i -ðOP   OPÞÞiAI;y
OJOPS:
We have to show:
1.
%
OP is a knowledge space,
2.
%
O
P is weak-universal for PI:
This implies the desired contradiction.
1. OP is nonempty, because PI is nonempty. That yJOP is a function from OP to S
is clear. Fix a player iAI:
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P: Then, there is a knowledge space
%
M in PI; m1AM; and a
morphism h from
%
M to
%
OC such that hðm1Þ¼o1: But then, ðm1;m1ÞAK
M
i ; hence
ðhðm1Þ;hðm1ÞÞAK
O
i ; so ðhðm1Þ;hðm1ÞÞAK
O
i -ðO
P   O
PÞ; that is, K
O
i -ðO
P  
O
PÞ is reﬂexive.
Let o1;o2AOP and ðo1;o2ÞAK
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ: Then, there is a knowledge
space
%
M in PI; m1AM; and a morphism h from
%
M to
%
OC such that hðm1Þ¼o1:
We have o2AK
O
i ðhðm1ÞÞ ¼ hðK
M
i ðm1ÞÞ: So there is a m2AM such that o2 ¼
hðm2Þ and ðm1;m2ÞAK
M
i : But then ðm2;m1ÞAK
M
i and therefore
ðo2;o1ÞAK
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ; so K
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ is symmetric.
Let o1;o2;o3AOP and ðo1;o2Þ;ðo2;o3ÞAK
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ: Then, as above,
there is a knowledge space
%
M in PI; m1;m2AM; and a morphism h from
%
M to
%
OC
such that ðm1;m2ÞAK
M
i ; hðm1Þ¼o1; and hðm2Þ¼o2: We have
o3AK
O
i ðhðm2ÞÞ ¼ hðK
M
i ðm2ÞÞ: So there is a m3AM such that o3 ¼ hðm3Þ and
ðm2;m3ÞAK
M
i : Then, ðm1;m3ÞAK
M
i ; so it follows that o3AhðK
M
i ðm1ÞÞ ¼
K
O
i ðo1Þ: Therefore ðo1;o3ÞAK
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ; so K
O
i -ðOP   OPÞ is transitive.
2. Let
%
MAPI: Then there is a morphism h from
%
M to
%
OC: For mAM is hðmÞAOP
and
y
OJO
PðhðmÞÞ ¼ y
OðhðmÞÞ ¼ y
MðmÞ:
We have hðK
M
i ðmÞÞDOP and hðmÞAOP; so
hðK
M
i ðmÞÞ ¼ K
O
i ðhðmÞÞ ¼ K
O
i -ðOP   OPÞðhðmÞÞ:
Hence h is a morphism from
%
M to
%
OP: &
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